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Abstract 
The labour income share is a key determinant of relevant macroeconomic variables, such as 
competitiveness, inflation, human capital accumulation, demand and income distribution. 
Simple economic models predict that the labour income share will fluctuate around a long-run 
value, thus implying a balanced growth path. However, in the past three decades a downward 
trend has been observed in various countries, especially in developed ones. To determine the 
sources of this trend, it is necessary, firstly, to address measurement issues, in particular the 
behaviour of self-employment, the role played by the non-market economy and the effect of 
the sectoral reallocation of activity. Then, various theoretical explanations are tested empirically, 
such as technological factors (capital-skill complementarity), international trade and changes in 
product and labour market regulations, controlling for the possible effects of the business 
cycle. This analysis reveals that the technological factors seem to be the most relevant 
determinants of the trend, and the labour income share is procyclical, but it lags one-year 
output movements. 
Keywords: labour income share, biased technological change, skilled labour, international 
trade, business cycle.  
JEL-Classification: E25, F62, J31, O33. 
    
 
 
Resumen 
La participación de las rentas del trabajo en el PIB es un determinante clave de variables 
económicas muy relevantes, como la competitividad, la inflación, la acumulación de capital 
humano, la demanda y la distribución de la renta. Los modelos económicos más sencillos 
predicen que la participación de las rentas del trabajo fluctuará en torno a un valor de 
equilibrio estable de largo plazo. Sin embargo, en las tres últimas décadas se ha observado 
una tendencia a la baja en diversos países, especialmente en los desarrollados. Para 
identificar los motivos que subyacen a esta tendencia, es necesario, en primer lugar, refinar 
la medición de esta variable, teniendo en cuenta, en concreto, el empleo no asalariado, el 
papel desempeñado por la economía no de mercado y el efecto de la reasignación sectorial 
de la actividad. En segundo lugar, se contrastan distintas explicaciones teóricas, tales como 
el efecto de factores tecnológicos (complementariedad entre el factor capital y el empleo 
cualificado), del comercio internacional y de cambios en la regulación de los mercados de 
producto y de trabajo, teniendo en cuenta la posición cíclica de la economía. Este análisis 
revela que los factores tecnológicos parecen ser los principales determinantes de esta 
tendencia, y que la participación de las rentas del trabajo es procíclica, pero se retrasa un 
año respecto a las fluctuaciones de la producción. 
Palabras clave: participación de las rentas del trabajo, progreso tecnológico sesgado, 
empleo cualificado, comercio internacional, ciclo de negocios.  
Códigos JEL: E25, F62, J31, O33. 
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1 Introduction 
Gross domestic product (GDP) can be disaggregated in different ways, depending on the 
subject of the analysis. On the revenue side, the focus is placed on the income obtained by 
each productive factor in compensation for its participation in the productive process. From a 
broad perspective, there are two primary productive factors: labour and capital, obtaining 
income from their contribution to production; and the public sector, which collects taxes on 
production to finance its activities. In this respect, the share of production obtained by labour, 
the labour income share, has been a source of much interest for the literature, as it can be 
considered an indicator of the inefficiencies in the product market and is a determinant of 
inflation, competitiveness, human capital accumulation, demand and the distribution of 
income, among other variables.             
Simple economic models predict that the labour income share will fluctuate around 
a long-run value, thus implying a balanced growth path. However, in the past three 
decades a downward trend has been observed in various countries, especially in 
developed ones. This basically implies that, since the eighties, the increase in labour 
compensation has been lower than the increase in the output to which it contributes. 
Various explanations have been put forward to justify this phenomenon. But, before testing 
the theoretical models, it is necessary to elabourate on labour income share measurement 
issues, to which we devote the first part of the paper.  
Labour is usually performed by employees and the self-employed; therefore, the 
labour income share should include the revenues from labour of both groups of workers. In 
the first case, compensation of employees is an observable variable (up to non-wage 
compensation). In the second case, compensation of labour and capital is jointly observed, so 
a procedure should be implemented to separate both elements. The second relevant 
statistical factor to consider is the role played by the non-market economy. This branch of 
activity occupies a significant share of the labour force, but the relevant decisions on 
employment and wages probably do not fit well in profit maximisation models; therefore, they 
should be treated differently. These two elements are analysed in the second section of this 
document, in order to obtain a better proxy for the labour income share. In the third section, 
sectoral reallocation of activity is investigated, as this can be also a driver of the changes in 
the labour income share, provided not all the branches are equally intensive in the use of the 
two primary productive factors.  
Once these statistical elements have been taken on board, the economic literature 
considers different factors that can explain movements in the labour income share of the 
market economy. On one hand, these could be the result of technological factors. In 
particular, to make a downward trend in the labour income share compatible with an upward 
trend in the capital/labour ratio and in skilled/unskilled jobs, it is necessary to rely on the 
complementarity between skilled labour and capital as opposed to the substitutability 
between unskilled labour and capital jointly with capital-biased technological progress. On the 
other hand, changes in the allocative efficiency of the economy can also affect the labour 
income share. Another element that this literature has emphasised considerably is the 
relationship of the labour income share to international trade. This association is incorporated 
into the previous framework both through technology (intermediate imports) and through the 
impact of international trade on competition (imports of final goods). However, there is no 
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analysis of whether skill-biased technological change is induced by international trade. Finally, 
the possible impact of the business cycle on the labour income share has to be taken into 
account, insofar as there are different theories highlighting its relevance. 
Thus, in the second part of the paper, in section four, an aggregate empirical model 
is estimated to identify the main determinants of our measure of labour income share, which 
includes self-employment and excludes the non-market economy.  This model is used to 
obtain the contribution of these determinants to the pattern of the labour income share in the 
past three decades in seven developed countries (USA, Japan, Germany, France, UK, Italy 
and Spain). The final section points to future avenues of research. 
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2 Measuring the labour income share  
On a National Accounts basis, the gross domestic product can be divided in three major 
items on the income side: i) compensation of employees, ii) gross operating surplus/gross 
mixed income and iii) net taxes on products and imports. This disaggregation tries to identify 
the revenues that are captured by the owners of the labour (compensation of employees), the 
owners of the capital (gross operating surplus/gross mixed income) and the public sector (net 
taxes on products and imports). However, employees are only a fraction of labour, as long as 
in all the countries there are self-employees. Contrary to employees, self-employees are the 
owners of the capital they use to produce. As a consequence, it is not surprising that the 
National Accounts aggregate both the remuneration to that capital and the compensation for 
the labour of these workers under the second item, the gross operating surplus. However, 
from an empirical perspective, part of it should be allocated to labour and added to the 
compensation of employees to obtain a more global estimate of the labour income. 
Thus, starting the analysis with the compensation of employees, the share it 
represents on GDP shows a high heterogeneity among developed countries. In particular, 
considering averages of the last three decades, the ceiling is observed in USA (57.5%) and 
the floor in Italy (43.1%). Most of these differences can be explained by institutional – such as 
the proportion of self-employment (see below) –, technological factors – as analysed in 
section four – and the productive specialisation of the economy. However, the most notorious 
characteristic of this variable is its declining trend, at least since the eighties (see figure 1). The 
intensity of this decline has been also heterogeneous among countries and decades, but in 
the full sample period reductions have been recorded in all countries.        
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FIGURE 1. EVOLUTION OF COMPENSATION OF EMPLOYEES OVER GDP
Source: AMECO (European Commission)  
In particular, the countries showing the highest reduction have been Germany and 
Italy (–8.5 and –6.1 percentage points, respectively), followed by USA and UK (–4.3 in both 
cases), Spain and France (–3.1 and –2.7, respectively); in the case of Japan the reduction has 
been the lowest (–0.3). This downward trend has been observed in most of the decades; the 
exceptions have been Spain, France, USA and Japan in the nineties and France, Italy and UK 
between 2000 and 2010. 
As it was explained above, the compensation of employees provided by the National 
Accounts does not cover all the revenues obtained by labour. In particular, the revenues of 
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self-employment are included in the gross operating surplus. This is due to the difficulty in 
separating the part of their revenues that is compensating labour and the part that is 
compensating capital. In order to take into account this factor, it has been imputed a labour 
revenue to self-employment. The imputation procedure consists on assuming that the 
labour compensation of the average non-wage earner in each sector is the same than that 
of the average employee. This assumption is made operative taking into account that the 
social contributions of self-employment and employees could be different, and using 
sectoral information, as both wages and the proportion of self-employment are different 
depending on the branch of activity.1
In broad terms, this imputation procedure implies that the labour income share will 
be higher in all countries, but its trend could be modified depending on the behaviour of the 
self-employment compared to employees. As can be seen in figure 2, there are important 
differences among countries in the share these workers represent in the labour force. Italy 
shows the higher rate (35%) and USA the lowest (8.5%). Most of the countries have shown a 
downward trend, although increases have been recorded in Germany and UK. On the 
contrary, in USA this ratio has been quite stable. Leaving apart the two extreme cases, Italy 
and USA, all the other countries seem to converge towards rates around 15%.    
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FIGURE 2. NON-WAGE EARNERS SHARE (based on hours)
Source: AMECO (European Commission), EU-KLEMS and own calculations  
As can be seen in figure 3, when this imputation is added to the compensation of 
employees, the labour income share increases in all the countries and by more in the cases where 
it was lower. Therefore, there is a convergence in the labour income share of this sample of 
countries. Now, the ceiling as an average of the last three decades is observed in Japan (62.9%) 
and the floor in Spain (57.2%), thus reducing the range width to 6 percentage points compared to 
14 without considering self-employment labour revenues. Italy is the country where self-
employment cumulates higher compensation (16.2 percentage points of GDP as an average of the 
three decades) with USA in the opposite side (4.7 percentage points). In any case, the aggregate 
downward trend in the labour income share is even more accentuated when self-employment is 
included. In fact, the reduction is around 3 points higher in Italy, around 4 percentage points in 
Spain and France, and higher than 9 percentage points in Japan. The exception to this rule is UK, 
where the reduction is now 2.7 percentage points compared to 4.3 when self-employment is 
excluded. Finally, Germany and USA barely show any changes. Again, only in specific decades in 
specific countries the labour income share has increased. Therefore, the reallocation of labour in 
favour of self-employment cannot explain the downward trend in the labour income share. 
                                                                            
1 The appendix describes in more detail the construction of this dataset. 
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FIGURE 3. EVOLUTION OF COMPENSATION OF EMPLOYMENT OVER GDP
Source: AMECO (European Commission), EU-KLEMS and own calculations  
This measure of the participation of labour in income should be seen as a measure of 
the labour cost more than a measure of the income workers took home (Box 1 below 
explains the main differences between both). The first variable is relevant to analyse the 
productive process, as it is done in this paper, the second one to determine the demand and 
its structure, which will be the natural follow up of this study.  
Box 1. Labour cost and workers net revenue 
The labour cost constructed in the main text includes both social contributions (by employers 
and employees) and the personal income tax, so it is higher than the take home pay obtained 
by workers. By excluding taxes from the labour income share we get a better proxy of the 
disposable income associated to labour obtained by households, although it still excludes 
deferred salaries (for example, pensions) and other benefits prefunded by workers (for 
example, unemployment benefits).    
In any case, once these fiscal factors are excluded, the measure of the net labour income 
share is significantly below that obtained previously (see figure 1.1). The correction is 
especially high in the cases of Germany, France and Italy (over 20 percentage points), 
followed by Spain, UK and Japan (around 16 percentage points) and, finally, USA (14 
percentage points). Besides, this adjustment makes the dispersion among countries to 
increase substantially. 
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FIGURE 1.1. EVOLUTION OF NET COMPENSATION OF EMPLOYMENT OVER GDP
Source: AMECO (European Commission), EU-KLEMS and own calculations  
This adjustment does not change the downward trend in the labour income share in the full 
sample, although in some countries the trend is intensified and in others smoothed, 
depending on the behaviour of direct taxation. In Germany, UK and USA direct taxation of 
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labour has diminished compared to 1980, thus allowing for a smaller decline in the net labour 
income share. This effect is especially notorious in UK, where the net labour income share 
has remained stable. In these three countries the reduction of labour taxation has been the 
result of an increase in social contributions more than compensated by a cut in the personal 
income tax. In the other countries, the increase in direct taxation has implied a deeper 
reduction in the net labour income share. This is especially the case of Japan and Spain and, 
to a lesser extent, of Italy and France. In all these countries, both social contributions (except 
in the case of France) and the personal income tax have shown an increase in the whole 
sample period. 
 
Another important statistical element to take into account for the empirical analysis of 
the rest of this paper, is the role played by the non-market economy in the behaviour of the 
labour income share. This sector employs a significant part of the labour force; however, 
there are very good reasons to believe that the labour policy followed by their managers do 
not fit exactly with the theoretical models to be presented afterwards. Besides, the 
denominator of the labour income share in this sector is and accounting artifact, as long as 
prices are not observable and, therefore, compensation of capital is proxied by the 
consumption of fixed capital. Therefore, it is advisable to exclude this sector from the analysis.  
We proxy the labour income share of the non-market economy with that of the 
community, social and personal services, which includes the public sector activity. Figure 4 
and table 1 show the level and the evolution of the labour income share of these sectors over 
the whole economy GDP. As can be seen, the labour income share of the non-market 
economy represents below 20% of the GDP. There is certain heterogeneity among countries, 
being higher in USA (19.3% as an average over the sample period) and lower in Japan (14%). 
Contrary to the whole economy labour income share, an upward trend is observed in all the 
countries. In particular, an increase of around 4 percentage points has been recorded in UK 
and USA, around 3 percentage points in Spain and France and around 1.5 percentage points 
in Italy, Germany and Japan. The increase in the labour income share of the non-market 
economy has been generalized in the three decades, being the exceptions Germany, France 
and Japan during the eighties and Spain, Italy and USA during the nineties.  
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FIGURE 4. THE EVOLUTION OF THE LABOUR INCOME SHARE
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The upward trend in the labour income share of the non-market economy implies 
that the downward trend in the labour income share of the market economy has been more 
pronounced than that of the whole economy. As it was shown in figure 4, the sample of 
countries considered in this analysis presents a labour income share in the market economy 
between 51% (Spain) and 57% (Germany) as an average over the last three decades, 
implying dispersion similar to that of the whole economy. However, in the last years it has 
diminished below 50% in some countries (Spain, Italy and USA), in a trend that is common to 
the other countries. In fact, since 1980 the decline in the labour income share has been 
higher than 10 percentage points in Japan, Italy, Spain and Germany; France and USA have 
seen reductions of around 7 percentage points and in UK below 5 percentage points. 
Reductions have been generalized in the eighties and the nineties (the only exceptions were 
USA and Spain in the nineties), with a slight rebound in some countries in the last decade. 
TABLE 1. THE EVOLUTION OF THE LABOUR INCOME SHARE 
 
 USA Japan Germany France UK Italy Spain 
Total economy (%GDP)       
1980 64.24 70.02 67.24 65.69 65.47 64.92 61.15 
1990 62.78 61.55 62.46 59.48 62.13 64.75 57.38 
2000 63.00 62.03 62.59 57.82 53.81 62.16 57.55 
2010 59.79 59.32 58.92 59.31 56.45 63.31 54.51 
   Market economy (%GDP)       
1980 46.64 56.07 51.62 48.83 51.62 49.00 47.03 
1990 43.37 49.05 47.28 43.34 46.16 48.07 41.81 
2000 44.38 47.91 45.76 39.69 39.64 44.48 42.11 
2010 38.35 43.69 41.89 39.78 40.71 42.86 37.43 
   Non-market (%GDP)       
1980 17.60 13.95 15.62 16.86 13.85 15.92 14.12 
1990 19.42 12.50 15.18 16.13 15.97 16.68 15.57 
2000 18.62 14.12 16.83 18.13 14.17 17.68 15.44 
2010 21.43 15.63 17.03 19.53 15.74 20.45 17.09 
 Addendum item 
   Market economy (%VA market economy)*     
1980 56.68 63.87 63.95 58.28 61.87 60.17 56.28 
1990 54.15 52.48 58.82 52.64 57.09 59.81 50.78 
2000 55.54 50.62 57.99 48.89 46.86 55.43 51.69 
2010 49.79 51.71 53.99 50.47 49.72 55.58 46.05 
 Sources: AMECO (European Commission), EU-KLEMS and own calculations. 
(*) This is the variable to be used in the empirical analysis below. 
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3 Disaggregating the components of the labour income share  
The labour income share can be disaggregated in two main components: real wage and 
labour productivity. Obviously, the decline of the labour income share in the market economy 
is the result of a global increase of the real wages below that of the labour productivity. 
However, there exist important differences among countries in both variables and in their 
evolution in the three decades (see table 2). Thus, in all these countries labour productivity 
has shown an average increase over 2% (except in the case of Italy), being Japan and UK the 
countries that improved the most the efficiency of labour. In most of the countries the labour 
productivity has shown a decelerating path, recording the highest increases in the eighties 
and the lowest in the last decade. The exceptions to this rule are USA, which is showing an 
accelerating path, and Spain, that in the last decade has stabilized labour productivity growth, 
although at a level well below that of USA.  
With respect to real wages, the highest increases have been recorded in UK and 
USA and the lowest in Spain and, especially, in Italy. As expected, there is a very high rank 
correlation of real wages growth and labour productivity growth in the whole sample, but this 
has not been the case in the different decades. Contrary to the generalized decelerating path 
observed for labour productivity, in the case of real wages there is substantial heterogeneity. 
In particular, in Japan, Germany and France the maximum average growth rate of real wages 
was observed in the nineties; in USA an accelerating path is recorded (more muted in the last 
decade), just the opposite of UK and Spain; Italy is the only country where real wages 
accelerated during the last decade.       
TABLE 2. DISSAGGREGATING THE EVOLUTION OF LABOUR INCOME SHARE IN 
THE MARKET ECONOMY  
(Average annual growth rates) 
 USA Japan Germany France UK Italy Spain 
Labour income share       
1980-1989 –0.50 –2.01 –0.88 –1.34 –0.31 –0.89 –1.49 
1990-1999   0.01 –0.33 –0.41 –0.84 –1.03 –1.96   0.20 
2000-2010 –1.08   0.23 –0.65   0.31   0.04   0.58 –1.14 
1980-2010 –0.25 –0.69 –0.57 –0.48 –0.25 –0.72 –0.66 
Labour productivity       
1980-1989   1.69   4.05   2.61   3.13   3.05   2.47   3.62 
1990-1999   2.32   2.60   2.47   2.64   3.32   1.81   1.49 
2000-2010   3.38   1.14   1.28   1.35   1.58   0.03   1.63 
1980-2010   2.53   2.65   2.19   2.34   2.59   1.47   2.10 
Real wages 
productivity 
       
1980-1989   1.18   2.08   1.61   1.81   2.88   1.93   2.39 
1990-1999   2.31   2.35   2.31   2.02   2.45   0.47   1.82 
2000-2010   2.32   1.42   0.71   1.59   1.55   0.55   0.35 
1980-2010   2.11   2.01   1.70   1.89   2.41   1.05   1.52 
  Source: EU-KLEMS and own calculations. 
Sometimes it has been argued that this downward trend in the labour income 
share can be the result of the reallocation of activity towards sectors less labour intensive. 
This could happen if there are significant differences in the labour income share among 
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sectors. Figure 5 tries to summarize the information on the labour income by sectors. As 
can be seen, this average of the labour income share lies between 60% and 70% of the 
sectoral value added in most of branches of activity. The exceptions are mining, processed 
food, chemicals, electricity, financial intermediation and business activities, all of them 
below that range. In particular, electricity generation and business activities present a 
labour income share around 30%. In the first case, this is the reflection of the high capital 
intensity of energy production and distribution technology; in the second, imputed rents to 
owner-occupied dwellings in real estate activities explain this low ratio. The highest range 
(that is, the difference between the maximum and the minimum) is observed in agriculture, 
mining and hotels and restaurants and the lowest in some of the manufacturing sectors, 
where the technologies are more homogeneous.  
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FIGURE 5. LABOUR INCOME SHARE BY SECTORS IN THE MARKET ECONOMY
Source: EU-KLEMS and own calculations
Note: For each sector, the top of the bar represents the highest labor income share of the countries considered in this paper and the 
bottom the lowest; the bullet captures the non-weighted average.
 
 In the last three decades sustained trends in the structure of value added in the market 
economy have been observed. As can be seen in figure 6, these trends are quite homogeneous 
among this group of countries. In the case of broad branches of activity, agriculture and 
manufacturing have lost relevance (in fact, all the manufacturing branches reduced its weight in all 
the countries), being gained by market services. In the case of construction, it has lost importance 
in all the countries apart from Spain and UK. On the contrary, the weight of electricity generation 
has increased in all countries except UK and France.  
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FIGURE 6. TRENDS IN SECTORAL VALUE ADDED SHARES (1980-2010)
Source: EU-KLEMS and own calculations
Note: For each sector, the top of the bar represents the highest change in the sectoral value added share between 1980 and 2012 among the 
countries considered and the bottom the lowest; the bullet captures the non-weighted average.
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From an aggregate perspective, service sectors are, in general, more labour intensive 
than manufacturing, so it could be though that these tendencies in productive specialisation is 
at odds with the aggregate labour income share trend. However, figure 6 shows that only two 
service sectors have increased significantly its relevance: business activities and financial 
intermediation (Italy is the only country were this last sector has lost weight), and these two 
sectors are characterized by a labour intensity much lower than the average of the service 
sector and even the manufacturing sector, as we saw before. The traditional service sector 
activities (more labour intensive than the manufacturing sector) such as trade and hotels and 
food services, have remained relatively stable in all the countries considered except Spain. All 
the manufacturing sectors in all countries have reduced its weight, suggesting a process of 
outsourcing. In fact, in all these countries intermediate inputs have increased its weight in 
gross output: in Italy it has gained 7 percentage points, in Germany, Spain and France 
between 2 and 3, and in the others around 1. Basic metals, textiles, chemicals and 
processed food have been the sectors that have lost more relevance. This is probably related 
to the process of outsourcing-offshoring which is reflected in the substantial increase of the 
imports of intermediate goods as a share of gross production, much higher than that of all 
intermediate goods. 
In order to check if the observed reallocation of activity explains the trend in the 
labour income share, an exercise has been performed maintaining the weights of the different 
sectors in the economy at the levels observed in a specific year (1995). Admittedly, this 
exercise has important drawbacks, as it depends on the level of disaggregation of the 
information, but, at least, it could rule out some possible explanations for this phenomenon. 
Table 3 shows that the effect of sectoral reallocation of activity is quite significant in explaining 
the evolution of the labour income share. In particular, the effect of sectoral reallocation 
seems to have been very important in Germany, USA, Italy and Japan (it explains around 60% 
of the cumulated decline in the labour income share), significant in France and Japan (50%) 
and reduced in Spain (10%). Therefore, the higher relevance of business activities and 
financial intermediation explain an important part (but not all) of the trend in the labour income 
share in all countries except Spain, where the weight gained by construction, trade and hotels 
and restaurants, has counteracted that effect.  
TABLE 3. THE EFFECT OF SECTORAL REALLOCATION OF ACTIVITY ON THE 
LABOUR INCOME SHARE  
(% over market economy GDP) 
 USA Japan Germany France UK Italy Spain 
Observed differences       
1980-1989 –2.5 –11.4  –5.2 –5.7 –0.4    –4.9   –5.6 
1990-1999   1.4   –1.9  –1.2 –3.7 –4.4  –10.2     0.8 
2000-2010 –5.7     1.1  –3.8   1.5   0.2     2.7   –5.6 
1980-2010 –6.9 –12.3    –10.2 –7.9 –4.6 –12.4 –10.4 
Simulated differences       
1980-1990  –0.1  –9.4  –1.6 –5.7 –2.4  –1.6   –5.8 
1990-2000   1.6    0.4    1.7 –2.2 –2.3  –8.4     1.2 
2000-2010 –4.0    2.4  –3.0   4.0   2.8    5.0   –4.8 
1980-2010 –2.6  –6.6  –2.9 –5.0 –1.9  –5.0   –9.3 
  Source: EU-KLEMS and own calculations  
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 17 DOCUMENTO OCASIONAL N.º 1209 
4 Determinants of the evolution of the labour income share in the market economy 
The labour income share in the different countries displays important fluctuations, as shown in 
the previous section. In fact, it is apparent a downward trend in the last three decades. 
Although this trend is partially mitigated when sectoral reallocation of activity is considered, it 
seems a stylized fact that labour cost has lost relevance in value added. This downward trend 
is at odds with the traditional modelling of the productive process as a Cobb-Douglas 
production function with unitary elasticity of substitution between the primary productive 
factors, as it implies a constant labour income share. Therefore, first of all it is necessary to 
relax this framework, considering the possibility of having an elasticity of substitution between 
primary factors different than one, which, if there are changes in the relative supply of the 
factors or input specific technological progress, would imply a non constant labour income 
share. The simplest approach to allow for this possibility is considering CES-type production 
functions. In the second place, there could be rigidities in the product and factor markets 
generating gaps between the real wage and the marginal product of labour. If these rigidities 
change, the equilibrium labour income share can also permanently change, implying a 
downward or upward trend during the adjustment process to the new equilibrium. Besides, 
the labour income share can be also affected by the business cycle, although this cannot 
generate a permanent change in the labour income share, but only fluctuations around the 
level of equilibrium. 
Starting with the technological factors, one of the most comprehensive approaches 
is that of Arpaia et al. (2009). They consider four productive factors that are combined 
through a series of nested CES production functions, thus allowing for different elasticities of 
substitution among them. At the lower level of the production process, a CES is considered 
between skilled labour (Ls) and capital (AK, A stands for capital augmenting technological 
progress), which delivers X, the composite input for the second production function below:           
 
η is the elasticity of substitution between these two productive factors. This parameter should 
be positive and in case being lower (higher) than 1, it implies that an increase in the supply of 
capital increases (reduces) the income share of skilled labour compensation (on the 
composite X). Thus, if the elasticity is lower than one, these two productive factors are 
complements; if it is higher than one, substitutes.  
The second CES relates the previous composite input (X) with unskilled labour (Lu) to 
generate value added (Y). The elasticity of substitution in this case is captured with a new 
parameter (ρ), in order to allow for a different complementary degree of capital with the two 
types of labour.  
                [2] 
      
                                             [1] 
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A final CES is used to combine value added and intermediate inputs to produce 
gross output (GO). The idea is that if the elasticity of substitution between value added and 
intermediate inputs is different than unity (λ), relative prices of intermediate inputs (M) will also 
affect the income shares on value added of the primary inputs. 
   
After some algebra, it can be shown that, with this characterization of the 
technology, the labour income share on value added will depend in a very non-linear way on 
five main variables: i) capital augmenting technological progress; ii) capital-output ratio; iii) the 
skilled-unskilled labour ratio; iv) the capital-skilled labour ratio; and, v), the relative price of 
intermediate inputs. The sign of the derivatives of the labour income share with respect to 
these variables depends on the degree of substitution of the different productive factors. In 
particular, we are interested in defining the conditions to deliver a negative impact of these 
five variables on the labour share which is what the data suggest. 
The first condition for capital-augmenting technological progress to have a 
negative effect on the labour income share is that the composite input X and unskilled 
labour were substitutes. This implies that a positive capital augmenting technological shock 
reduces the labour income share of unskilled labour. However, the labour income share of 
skilled labour can diminish or increase, as it is the product of the share of the composite 
capital-skilled labour on value added (that increases under the previous condition) and the 
share of skilled labour income on the composite. This last share will increase or diminish 
depending on the elasticity of substitution between skilled labour and capital. When they 
are complements it increases, but if the degree of complementarity is more reduced than 
the degree of substitution of unskilled labour and the composite, this will not be enough to 
compensate the reduction in the unskilled labour income share and the aggregated labour 
income share will diminish. 
The conditions to observe a negative sign in the derivative of the labour income share 
with respect to the capital intensity are essentially the same than in the previous case, and exactly 
for the same reasons. In fact, the theoretical model establishes that both variables should enter in 
the model with the same parameter, although in the empirical approach below this constrain will 
be relaxed as long as a proxy for the capital augmenting technological progress will be used. 
The sufficient condition for the ratio of skilled to unskilled labour to have a negative 
impact on the labour income share is that the composite X and unskilled labour are highly 
substitutes. In these circumstances, an increase in this ratio reduces the income share of 
unskilled workers. In the case of skilled labour, there are two counteracting forces: more 
skilled workers will be hired, but with a lower skill premium, as skilled workers supply has 
increased. This implies an aggregate reduction in the labour income share. 
With respect to the capital-skilled labour ratio, the relation with the labour income 
share is unambiguously positive. If capital supply increases above skilled labour, there will be 
an increase in the relative demand of skilled labour, thus pushing upwards the wage premia 
and the labour income share of skilled workers. However, these movements have no effect on 
the labour income share of unskilled labour.  
                             [2] 
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Finally, in the case of the relative price of intermediate inputs, the derivative of the 
labour income share is positive for all the admissible elasticities of substitution. This is due 
to the specification of the nested CES, implying less substitution between intermediate 
inputs and capital than between unskilled labour (and therefore, aggregate labour) and 
intermediate inputs. Thus, following a positive shock to the intermediate prices, the relative 
demand of unskilled labour will increase by more than that of capital, thus increasing the 
labour income share. 
The previous variables were technological, changing the labour income share along a 
path in which real wages are equal to marginal product of labour. However, there could be 
other factors, related to the efficiency in the resource allocation, which can affect the labour 
income share by pushing it out of the path explained above. Those are elements that 
introduce a gap between the marginal product of labour and real wages. Thus, in the first 
place, if competition in the product markets is not perfect, it will show as a mark-up (µ), that 
allocates to the income share of capital more revenues than in the case of perfect 
competition. Therefore, declines (increases) in the degree of competition imply a reduction 
(increase) in the labour income share. 
The labour market could also show rigidities, implying, again, a gap between the 
labour productivity and the real wages. If the model followed in the negotiations between 
trade unions and firm representatives is that of “efficient bargaining”, that is, if both wages 
and employment are negotiated at the same time, the highest the power of the trade union, 
the highest the labour income share. Notice that in case of negotiation taking place on the 
basis of a “right to manage” model (wages are bargained first, and afterwards firms chose the 
level of employment that maximizes profits), bargaining power does not affect the labour 
income share, once it is controlled by the capital intensity, as higher wages are ex-post 
compensated by higher capital and lower employment (Bentolila and Saint-Paul, 2003).  
It seems also necessary to include a variable capturing the position of the economy 
in the business cycle, as long as the labour income share can also be affected by the demand 
pressure. However, there are well founded reasons to sustain a positive or a negative effect. 
The business cycle determines the probability of being in unemployment, which is a crucial 
element to determine the sensitiveness of the trade union to the trade-off between wages and 
employment, implying, therefore that when demand pressures are high (low) the risk of 
unemployment is reduced (increased), and wages rise (diminish) jointly with employment, so 
the derivative is positive. On the other hand, labour hoarding, for example, implies that during 
crisis workers are not fired to avoid future hiring costs; this would imply a negative relation. 
Therefore, the final effect is mainly an empirical matter. 
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5 Estimation results 
In order to estimate this model, a data set for seven advanced countries (USA, Japan, 
Germany, France, UK, Italy and Spain) has been elaborated.2
The mark-up of the product markets is proxied through the import prices of final 
goods (consumption and equipment), assuming that domestic producers confront a certain 
external competition both in the domestic markets and in the external ones, implying that 
foreign prices are also a determinant of domestic ones (partial pricing-to-market). As a result, 
it is expected this relative price to have a negative effect on the labour income share. The 
replacement rate of unemployment benefits has been considered as a measure of the 
bargaining power of the trade unions; this variable has the advantage over other labour 
market institutions of having time and cross-section variation. Finally, the position of the 
economy in the business cycle is captured through the NAIRU-gap; therefore, the sign of the 
estimated coefficient should be interpreted inversely. Some other variables were constructed 
and disregarded due to its irrelevance in the empirical analysis. The most prominent case was 
the tax wedge of labour (social contributions and personal income tax). Taking into account 
that these taxes are included in the definition of the labour cost, this would imply that changes 
in taxation are fully absorbed by take-home salary or by employment.          
 Starting with the labour income, 
recall that it includes the imputation of the labour income of self-employment and excludes 
the non-market economy compensation of employees; correspondingly, the denominator of 
the labour income share is the addition of the market economy value added plus indirect 
taxes on production and imports (that is, the variable appearing in the lower panel of table 1). 
The capital augmenting technological progress is proxied with total factor productivity growth; 
this is the main reason to allow a different parameter than that of the capital intensity in the 
empirical analysis. Capital intensity corresponds to the capital-(market economy) output ratio 
and skilled/unskilled labour is captured by the number of white and blue collar workers, 
obtained from the disaggregation by occupation of the labour force surveys. The relative price 
of the intermediate inputs is constrained to capture only the imported price of intermediate 
goods, which is the right measure when an aggregate analysis of the economy is performed; 
therefore, this variable can be also used to estimate the impact of the process of off-shoring. 
A linear equation for the labour income share was estimated using panel data 
techniques. As can be seen in table 4, this equation was estimated with different 
methodologies. In the first column, OLS were applied; this approach has two major problems: 
i) it excludes the possibility of country specific omitted variables in the equation and ii) some or 
all the variables in the regression could be jointly determined. As a consequence, the second 
column includes the possibility of country specific fixed effects. Then, in the third column, all 
the variables of the right hand side are instrumented (using the second and the third lag of the 
same variables). Finally, in the fourth column the equation is estimated in first differences, thus 
considering the possibility of country specific fixed and random effects. This last procedure is 
the preferred one.    
 
                                                                            
2 The appendix shows the details of the elabouration of the dataset. 
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TABLE 4. ESTIMATES OF THE LABOUR INCOME SHARE 
 OLS OLS GMM GMM (dif.) 
Total factor productivity –1.095 
   (0.123) 
–0.612 
   (0.124) 
–0.712 
   (0.129) 
–1.033 
   (0.208) 
Capital intensity –0.810 
   (0.100) 
–0.323 
   (0.111) 
–0.162 
   (0.144) 
–0.140 
   (0.065) 
Skilled-unskilled labour ratio  0.193 
  (0. 174) 
–0.130 
   (0.052) 
–0.115 
   (0.057) 
–0.107 
   (0.048) 
Capital-skilled labour ratio  0.431 
  (0.073) 
 0.105 
  (0.071) 
 0.162 
  (0.087) 
 0.263 
  (0.059) 
Intermediate imports relative price  0.081 
  (0.016) 
 0.054 
  (0.013) 
 0.069 
  (0.018) 
 0.067 
  (0.030) 
Final imports relative price (–1) –0.150 
   (0.035) 
–0.103 
   (0.029) 
–0.131 
  (0.039) 
–0.087 
   (0.025) 
Replacement ratio  0.006 
  (0.008) 
–0.059 
   (0.090) 
–0.069 
  (0.011) 
 0.012 
  (0.017) 
NAIRU-gap (–1)  0.003 
  (0.003) 
–0.009 
   (0.003) 
–0.012 
  (0.004) 
–0.005 
  (0.002) 
Country dummies  No  Yes  Yes  - 
Standard deviations  0.047  0.033  0.034  0.029 
Residuals unit root test  *  *  *  ** 
Sargan test  -  -  0.648  0.509 
Observations  210  210  207  196 
Between parenthesis standard deviations; In the case of the unit root tests: (*) rejection 1%, (**) rejection 5% and (***) rejection 10%.   
Source: Own calculations  
 
Beginning with capital augmenting technological progress (proxied by total factor 
productivity), the coefficient is negative and statistically significant, suggesting that unskilled 
labour and the composite input are substitutes, while skilled labour is a complement of 
capital. The estimated parameter is close to the unity, as it was found by Bentolila and Saint-
Paul (2003) using a sample of OECD countries with sectoral disaggregation. Consistently with 
this result, a negative sign is also estimated for the capital-output ratio (capital intensity); 
however, the differences in both parameters are quite large, suggesting that the proxy used 
for capital augmenting technological progress can be improved. The parameter of the skilled-
unskilled labour is estimated with more uncertainty, but the negative sign is again consistent 
with the hypothesis of capital-skill complementarity pointed before. On the contrary, the ratio 
of capital to skilled labour is always significant and positive, as expected from the theoretical 
model. The relative import price of intermediate goods has also a positive and statistically 
significant effect on the labour income share, as expected, too; this implies that when 
intermediate input prices in international markets diminish by more than domestic prices, the 
domestic labour income share also declines, as long as there is a substitution of domestic 
inputs, especially labour, for imported inputs.  
On the contrary, the impact of the relative import price of final goods (consumption 
and equipment) is negative. This is so because this variable tries to capture the behaviour of 
domestic mark-ups, that increase when price of competitors increase and diminish when the 
price of competitor diminish. However, increases (reductions) in mark-ups imply a reduction 
(increase) of the labour income share. Moving now to the labour market variables, the 
elasticity of the replacement ratio is estimated with uncertainty; in fact, it is always statistically 
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non-significant and it changes its sign from one procedure to another. This could be due to 
the inadequacy of this indicator to proxy the bargaining power of the trade unions or to the 
organization of the bargaining in the labour market, closer to the “right to manage” model 
than to the “efficient bargaining” one. With respect to the NAIRU-gap a negative and 
statistically significant coefficient is estimated with a lag of one year. This implies that the 
labour income share increases in the beginning of the recessions, after one year it diminishes 
until the first year of the recovery, to increase afterwards. 
This empirical model can be used to rationalize the evolution of the labour income 
share of the private sector in these countries in the last three decades. Thus, using the 
equation estimated in first differences, table 5 shows the contribution of each explanatory 
variable in the full sample period. As can be seen in the upper part of the table, in all the 
countries it is observed a reduction of the labour income share during this period. The 
intensity of the reduction is quite homogeneous among countries, except in the case of Italy, 
which is higher than the average, and UK, well below the average. The model captures 
adequately this downward trend in all the countries, but not so the intensity of the reduction. 
In particular, there is a clear overprediction in the cases of France and USA and an 
underprediction in the cases of Italy and Japan. Other relevant conclusion from this table is 
the commonality among countries in the behaviour of the explanatory variables; only in the 
cases of the relative import price and the replacement ratio the sign of the contribution differs 
among them in the full sample period. 
         TABLE 5. CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE CHANGE OF THE LABOUR INCOME 
SHARE. Annual average (1982-2010) 
 USA Japan Germany France Italy UK Spain 
Observed –0.43 –0.52 –0.56 –0.54 –0.79 –0.14 –0.58 
Explained –0.70 –0.13 –0.24 –0.94 –0.21 –0.40 –0.56 
TFP –1.30 –0.96 –0.76 –1.39 –0.59 –1.05 –0.80 
Capital intensity –0.13 –0.22 –0.20 –0.07 –0.15 –0.19 –0.17 
Skilled-unskilled 
labour ratio –0.09 –0.09 –0.10 –0.13 –0.08 –0.15 –0.23 
Capital-skilled 
ratio   0.77   1.04   0.82   0.50   0.56   0.85   0.46 
Interm. imports 
relative price   0.02   0.00 –0.12 –0.10 –0.15 –0.04 –0.14 
Final imports 
relative price   0.17   0.17   0.16   0.18   0.18   0.14   0.26 
Replacement 
ratio  0.00 –0.03 –0.01   0.01   0.05 –0.05 –0.01 
NAIRU-gap  0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00 
Source: EU-KLEMS and own calculations  
 Capital augmenting technological progress has been the major contributor to the 
decline in the labour income share; the interpretation is that technological progress 
substitutes the less skilled jobs in the productive process. This biased technological progress 
has been especially important in France, whereas in Italy it has had the least importance. This 
technological progress has been accompanied by an intensive investment process, 
increasing the capital deepening of all the economies, especially in the case of Japan; the 
reduced contribution in the cases of USA and France can be explained by the high capital 
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intensity they depart from. Unskilled labour has not been only substituted for capital, but also for 
skilled labour, thus additionally depressing the labour income share. Spain has been the country 
where this process has been more intense, although it has still not converged to the ratios of the 
other countries. On the contrary, the increase in the ratio of capital to skilled labour has 
counteracted the previous effects, especially in the case of Japan, whereas in Spain such 
counteraction is the least important. To finalize with the technological factors, the relative price of 
intermediate imports has had a slightly positive effect on the labour income share in the case of 
USA, null in Japan, and negative in the European countries, implying domestic labour has been 
substituted by intermediate imports. Adding all the technological factors together, a significant 
negative impact on the labour income share is obtained in all the countries, high in France and 
Spain, moderate in USA and UK and low in Japan, Italy and Germany. 
Moving now to the factors that make wages to differ from marginal productivity of 
labour, the most relevant is the relative price of final imports, which has had a positive effect in 
the labour income share of all the countries. This should be interpreted as a result of a 
generalized increase in competition in the product markets that has reduced mark-ups and, 
therefore, increase real wages for a given marginal productivity of labour. This suggests an 
improvement in the allocative efficiency of the world economy. This element has had the 
highest contribution in Spain and the lowest in UK, where the trade in services less open to 
competition is higher. Adding the results for both relative prices we can obtain the direct net 
effect (as opposed to the indirect one through the biased technological progress, that is not 
investigated here) of international trade on the labour income share. This effect has been 
positive in all the countries, implying that the impact of trade on competition is higher than on 
the off-shoring of domestic activities; in any case, it is interesting to see how in the euro area 
countries both factors have almost counteracted each other.  
As expected, the impact of the replacement ratio has been very reduced, and there 
is a certain heterogeneity among the countries; in UK has contributed to the reduction of the 
labour income share and the opposite in Italy. Obviously, the contribution of the NAIRU-gap 
has been also nil in the whole period, as long as, by construction, this variable has a mean of 
zero for long periods of time.  
In order to have a flavour on the homogeneity of this process during time, Figure 7 
shows the contribution of these factors by decades for the different countries. The first 
observation is that although the labour income share is in a declining trend, in some decades 
and some countries increases have been observed (UK in the eighties; USA in the 90’s; 
Japan, France and Italy in the 00’s). The technological component has had a negative 
contribution in most of the decades (exceptions are Japan and Italy in the 00’s) and larger (in 
absolute value) in the eighties (exceptions are USA, which has shown a slightly increasing 
trend, and UK in the 90’s). Finally, with respect to the allocative efficiency, it has had a 
positive and declining contribution; in fact, only in the cases of France, Italy and Spain the 
contribution has been positive in the 00’s. 
As it was explained above, the contribution of the NAIRU gap in the three decades 
has been also negligible; however, it helps in explaining the evolution of the labour income 
share during the expansions and the recessions. For example, the contribution of the NAIRU-
gap to the labour income share during the last decade is represented in figure 8. As can be 
seen, before the year 2009 most of the contributions were positive and growing, reflecting the 
demand pressures all these countries were suffering. This effect was maintained in all 
countries during 2009; in fact, this is the only explanative element of the generalized 
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increased of the labour income share in that year. On the contrary, in the year 2010, after two 
years of positive NAIRU gap, some countries have started to show a negative contribution of 
the cycle that, probably, will generalize to all the countries in the year 2011. 
       
 
FIGURE 7. MAIN CONTRIBUTORS TO THE EVOLUTION OF THE LABOUR INCOME SHARE
Source:  Own calculations
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6 Conclusions and further work 
A downward trend in the labour income share has been recorded in the past three decades in 
most of the advanced economies, as has been widely documented. This trend is robust to 
the behaviour of self-employment and of the non-market economy. Moreover, this trend is not 
only explained by a reallocation of activity from labour-intensive sectors to knowledge-
intensive sectors; in fact, most of the sectors have shown reductions in their corresponding 
labour income shares. 
This behaviour seems to be consistent with the hypothesis of complementarity 
between capital and skilled labour (which the empirical analysis seems to validate), as 
opposed to the substitutability between unskilled labour and capital. In particular, capital-
augmenting technological progress and the intensity of the investment process explain the 
increase in the relative demand for skilled jobs, provided capital is more a substitute of 
unskilled jobs than a complement of skilled workers. The impact of trade in the labour income 
share is captured using two relative prices: those of intermediate imports, to capture off-
shoring effects, and those of final imports, to capture competition effects. In the period 
considered, the second effect dominates the former, implying that trade has contributed to 
increasing the labour income share by reducing the prices of final goods to workers and, 
therefore, increasing their purchasing power. However, possible indirect impacts of trade 
inducing specific technological progress are not analysed. Labour market institutions such as 
the replacement ratio or the tax wedge seem not to be relevant in the specification. Our 
analysis also finds that the labour income share is procyclical, although it lags the output gap 
by one year. This implies that, at the beginning of a downturn, the labour income share 
increases before declining until one year after the upturn.      
Future steps in our research will use the labour income share to explain the 
composition of expenditure in these economies. In particular, we will analyse the impact this 
trend could have on households’ consumption/saving decisions, taking into account the 
financial stance and the existing uncertainty. Probably, this impact, if it exists at all, will 
depend on the underlying forces determining the behaviour of the labour income share. 
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APPENDIX. THE DATABASE 
Compensation of employees by main sectors: From 1980 to 2007 data are obtained from 
EU-KLEMS data base. Afterwards, they are enlarged using national statistical sources. 
 
GDP: see previous variable. 
 
Total employment and employees: see previous variable. 
 
Social contributions: obtained from national sources. It is assumed that the effective tax rates 
are the same in all the sectors of the same country. 
 
Income tax revenues: see the previous variable. 
 
Compensation of self-employment: this is the product (by sectors) of net (of social 
contributions) compensation per employee by self employment, plus the social contribution 
paid by non wage earners. 
 
Capital stock: AMECO 
 
Employment by occupation: taken from labor force surveys. Skilled jobs are the following: 
Directors and managers, Scientific technicians and professionals and intellectuals, 
Technicians and support professionals, Skilled agricultural workers and Skilled workers in 
manufacturing and construction. 
 
Import prices of goods: obtained from national sources 
 
Unemployment benefits: obtained from national sources 
 
NAIRU-gap: AMECO 
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